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Prior to the last decade, federal water-project THE POLICY PROCESS construction programs dominated water policy. These programs continue, but at a reduced levels w n i g incremental politics within institutional guideof funding, and the nation now is defining a lines which are subject to change with time. new agenda of water resources issues to include w e The following brief description of this choice water quality management and water allocation. Economists engaged in studies of water a rei process is the basis for defining the content of Economists engaged in studies of water resources policy, and who seek to influence the water policy economics research and advising. sources policy, and who seek to influence the direction of policy through research, teaching, and extension will find these exciting times.
The Temporal Logic of the Policy However, I will argue that these also will be Process frustrating times unless economists become more
In a stable decision environment, the choice effective in designing water policy research and set of alternatives is limited to those which will in offering policy advice. This argument can be be incremental adjustments from the status quo. summarized as follows.
Incrementalism in decisionmaking is dictated by informational and computational limits on At present a great share of economists' time the ability to predict the consequences of any is devoted to the "craft" of policy economics; action; the best that can be achieved for any that is, to extending the principles derived from decision is a partial understanding of its imeconomic reasoning to public policy advising plications. Therefore, decisionmaking can be and to the development and use of empirical described as "probing" based upon trial, error, methods. As a result, economists have let the and feedback as the means of discovering more discipline rather than the policy context set about the choice environment and consewater resources research agenda. This approach quences of particular actions (Lindbloom) . As to problem definition has been justified by refa result, it is more accurate to describe choiceerence to an incorrect model of the public making as seeking incremental movement away choice process, which in turn has reduced the from problems, rather than striving to achieve effectiveness of water policy advice. Increasing some prespecified goal (Wildavsky, 1979) . the effectiveness of water policy economics will Incremental choice proceeds within the fragrequire changing the way economists define mented structure of authority and political inwater policy issues and directing more attention fluence found in democratic societies. As a result, to strategies of policy advising. These two acdecisions, even when incremental, do not reflect tivities are termed the "art" of policy economa consensus on the "right thing to do." Instead, ics.
decisions arise from a process in which different partisan groups decide to agree to a choice in To illustrate this argument, I will discuss both order to earn some (but not complete) satisthe changing character of United States water faction of their individual goals from the demanagement and the role of economists in dicisions made by the legislative and executive recting future changes. The interpretation of agencies. (Indeed, the legislators and bureauUnited States water policy history and the role crats themselves are part of this bargaining proof policy economics is based upon a model of cess.) In the process, policies "... are better the public policy process which is described described as happening than as decided upon." in the next section. (Lindbloom, p. 523 ).
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Incremental politics appears disorderly. There cussed. First, the dominant ideology provides is no hierarchical decision system in which the basis for the constitutional rules which deinformation is collected and then interpreted fine the legitimate scope of governmental acas it passes from the bottom to the top of a tivity. Second, operating rules foster the decision hierarchy. In reality, there is no deadministration of legitimized governmental aucision point; instead, as Lindbloom notes, dethority. Operating rules are the laws, organicisions aren't made, they happen. However, the zational forms and informal rules of order which decision process has its own temporal logic.
govern how interest groups, legislatures, exChoices are made in response to opportunities ecutive agencies, and the courts relate to each and constraints understood to be effective at other. Operating rules must direct incremental the moment a decision can be made.
politics so that public decisions are consistent (North, p. 201) . For purposes of this tions. It is possible in some cases to identify discussion two specific aspects of institutions, interest grouppressures that mirrorpositive as constraints on incremental politics, are disnet private benefits to the participants of I It is this particular aspect of actual choice which the public choice theorists critique. The rules governing incremental politics are found wanting whenever the political choices made do not serve the prespecified objective of efficiency in resource allocation (Anderson) . This paper puts great weight on political rationality as a proper basis for incremental political choice. Political rationality in choice deals first with the preservation and improvement of the decisionmaking structure (Wildavsky 1968) . Political rationality cares about gaining group acceptance for solutions to immediate problems while emphasizing the need to maintain the capacity for future decisionmaking; political rationality cares more for how decisions can be made and less for what particular decisions should be.
sufficient magnitude to explain such behavof water for depletable energy and mineral reior; but in many it is not possible. The sources (Pinchot) . Reflecting these concerns, modern environmental movement is one President Theodore Roosevelt's Inland Watersuch case (North, p. 56 During the New Deal period, an important Development institutional change was the "New Deal" ad-
The later years of the 19th century were charministrative agency (Ackerman and Hassler) . acterized by increasing concentration of ecoThis institutional adjustment was an attempt to nomic power in the nation's industrial promote the application of science to solving organizations and the final exploration of the the problems of the nation by isolating adminwestern frontier. Recognition of these forces istrative agencies from the exercise of interest was the foundation for the progressive consergroup influence. Only by careful, unbiased, vation movement which espoused two themes: vation movement which espoused two themes: evaluation of technical, economic, and social (i) redistributing the nations resource wealth facts, would there be hope for finding the best by public action and (ii) increasing the techsolution to the problems of modern society. In nical efficiency of resource use to offset an its purest form, this ideal was realized in the expected decline in the discovery of new sources formation of independent regulatory commisof natural wealth. As it applied to water mansions, but the principle extended to other agenagement, resource conservation called for the well. maximum development and engineering conThis "affirmation of expertise" (Ackerman and trol of the nation's water resources for power Hassler, p. 4) was part of a general social trend production and transportation. Such developwhich in the early part of this century, came ment, which would occur whenever technically to see science as the tool for human betterment feasible, was justified as permitting the substi- (Hart, p. 516) . To permit expert judgement to tution of the continuously renewable resource govern agency decisions, the New Deal agency's legislative mandate provided only the most genrelation with the natural world had the most eral policy direction (Lowi) . "Instead of imwidespread impact on public thought. The inposing a hard and fast solution to a complex tellectual leadership for this composite view and changing problem, the legislature should included such persons as Rachel Carson, Paul invite the agency to organize the expert knowlErlich, Rene Dubos, and Barry Commoner. These edge required for intelligent regulation" (Ackpeople wrote extensively and persuasively durerman and Hassler, p. 5). The courts were only ing the 1960's and 1970's, pointing out what to ensure that agency decisions were not "arthey saw as the increasing contamination of the bitrary and capricious"; that is, to ensure that natural world and warning of dire consequences serious consideration was given to relevant data of people's unrestrained exploitation of natural and expert opinion. The court was not to secsystems was not changed. ond-guess the agency, substituting its judgement e l ,for t agency expert . (Shapiro) One result of the environmental arguments for the agency expert (Shapiro) .
In water policy the creation ohe de was a questioning of the historical construction
In water policy, the creation of the inde- The ideology of the environmental movement for many years the recommendations of these also provided a legitimate base for new laws water project construction agencies were rarely which redirected the focus of water resources questioned, because of the belief in Congress policy and management. For example, the 1972 that a project planned by them was technically Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendsound and consistent with the social purposes ments, later reauthorized as the Clean Water of the nation's water program (Shabman, 1972) .
Act of 1977, focused attention of water quality rather than water development and had a stated goal of zero discharge of wastes into the nation's The Environmental Movement and the waters by 1985, signaling the intent to realloNew Environmental Agency cate property rights to use of the nation's water During the 1960's, the dominant resource aay from waste discharges. 4 Although econoconservation ideology began to shift away from mists have maligned the zero discharge goal, it the legacy of the progressive conservation was a political symbol of the legislative acmovement. Building upon the writings of Henry ceptance of the new environmental ideology.
5
Thoreau, George Perkins Marsh and the more A second institutional shift, coinciding with recent work of Aldo Leopold, the environmental the environmental movement, was a reassessmovement was grounded in the argument that ment of the ideal of the New Deal agency. The people's manipulation of nature for solely maattempt to give agencies maximum flexibility terial gain was unethical. However, blending in their legislative mandates, so they could make this ethical argument with the argument that decisions by expert judgment, was being called human survival depended upon a harmonious into question. The evidence was accumulating that interest group politics had often been as tions of Congress and the courts could ensure significant in agency decisions as the application that no undue influence was exerted by selected of expertise. Regulatory agencies were said to interest groups on the EPA choice of technology be "captured" by those they were to regulate and that issues of science policy were not subsubverting the broader purposes of their regmerged as issues of technical analysis. ulatory mandate (Ackerman and Hassler) . Spending decisions were said to be made in THE PRACTICE OF WATER POLICY response to a pork-barrel politics where an "iron-ECONOMICS triangle" of agency personnel, interest groups and congressional subcommittee members set The remainder of this paper draw upon the spending priorities to serve the interests they preceding discussion to provide a critical evalrepresented, subverting the desire to have deuation of the effectiveness of the current apcisions made to serve a rational plan of develproach to water policy economics research and opment (Lowi) . Indeed, as early as the 1950's, advising. In addition, suggestions are offered for the federal water project construction agencies increasing the policy effectiveness of water rewere used as examples of the failures of "pork source economists. barrel" politics to promote a rational pattern of water development projects (Maass, 1951) .
Perspectives on Water Policy However, support for project development Economics agencies remained strong until the 1970's, when support for water projects as an appropriate Frequently, water policy economics is miswater management alternative declined.
directed by an inappropriate model of the policy process. In this model, governmental A second argument against the ideal of the decisionmaking is comprised of a rational-anNew Deal agency was that pure expertise was alytical component and a political component. a myth. This was especially true for environDecisions proceed in a four step sequence. First, mental management where the questions needknowledge of all alternatives for action in a ing answers often appeared scientific, but in particular situation is established. Second, confact transcended science (Ricci and Molton) .
sequences of alternative actions are determined. For example, the choice to use epidemiological Third, alternatives are compared according to versus animal test evidence for establishing the preference ordering of the decisionmaker, health risk of chemicals is a question of what or a hypothetical entity termed "the state." one author terms "science policy" (Ashford, Fourth, a decision rule permits selection of a Ryan and Caldart). Likewise, weighting of health single alternative from among the choice set. risks versus costs of a chemical ban is not a e tat decision rule is embodied in the The state's decision rule is embodied in the simple matter of scientific calculation (Crandall concept of the social welfare function which and Lave). In making science policy, there was includes arguments such as economic effireason to provide for political and judicial ovciency, equity, and environmental quality (Steiersight on the exercise of agency decisions.
ner). The importance of the various welfare This shift in viewpoint about the role of exarguments is established by a "diffuse" political pertise in public policy affected the writers of process. As seen in this model, the role of the the environmental legislation of the 1970's. In policy economist is to conduct a separate obmuch of the new environmental legislation, jective analysis that provides "informational inCongress, not the agency, set the goals, set puts" (Randall, p. 90) on the impact of particular timetables for goal achievement, and directed alternatives on the various arguments in the that the goals be attained by the application of state's welfare function. However, because no particular technologies (Ackerman and Hasparticular welfare argument would dominate sler). In the Federal Water Pollution Control another, the preferred alternative, in terms of Act Amendments of 1972, industrial and muany one argument, may not be chosen. For exnicipal waste dischargers were required to have ample, a benefit-cost analyst might explain deincreasingly sophisticated pollution control cisions which do not confor / to the equipment at specified future dates. At each economically efficient choice by suggesting there time the required technology would be, in EPA's was a predominance of other goals over ecojudgment, the "state-of-the-art" in pollution nomic efficiency. control, subject to a determination that the techAdherence to this choice model, as at least a nology was "economically achievable" (Freenormative ideal if not descriptive of reality, man, 1980). However, Congress and the courts permits economists to define policy research (through legislative provision for citizen suits) problems in terms of a hypothesized economic were expected to analyze EPA decisions and if efficiency objective, with studies drawing upon necessary, substitute their judgement, after the theoretical foundation and empirical aphearing from expert witnesses, for that of the plications of neo-classical welfare economics. agency. With this operating rule, oversight ac-
The policy advice to be derived from these analyses can be easily incorporated into the constrained by institutions and by the influence choice model previously described. As a result, of contending groups in the political process. the policy-economics literature abounds with However, institutional constraints are not presophisticated methods of valuing non-market cisely defined and are subject to change. In this goods in order to provide for more complete decision process, incremental choices are the benefit-cost analyses (Freeman, 1979) ; with basis for discovering the changing nature of proposals for innovative approaches to marproblems and acceptable solutions. Discovering ginal-cost pricing publically provided goods; boundaries and effectiveness of possible actions with demonstrations of the potential efficiency depends upon experimentation--trial and error. gains from substituting market and quasi-market It is here that analysis fits. "The trouble with allocation of resources for allocation by govlearning by experience is that one needs so ernmental administration (Anderson) . much of it. The attraction of analysis is that The reality is that most of this policy advice one need not live through everything" (Wilfalls on deaf ears (Cochrane) prior to an analytical study, the effect of that of government in distributing resources and study on decisions will still depend upon its shaping values. However, when economists let use by some partisan interest in support of their problems for policy analysis be solely defined own position. Alternatively, the economist might by economic efficiency principles, they implicconduct an analysis and then seek to find a itly seek "..
.to effect what can only be called partisan who is in agreement with the conclua revolution in the topicsforpolitical debate"
sions and recommendations of the study. In this (Kelman, p. 153) . Such analyses describe desense, policy economics begins with the "art" sirable (e.g. efficient) policy changes by ignorof "creating" (to use Wildavsky's, 1979 , terms) ing the political processes' primary concern clients for economic analyses. (The art of policy with equity and value questions. Equity coneconomics is discussed in the next section.) siderations in economics which are limited to proposals for lump-sum cash transfers and reBy contrast, the craft of water policy ecodistributive choices are embodied in a blackmics is the application of both the deductive box called the state's welfare function. Adherlogic of economics and the empirical tools of ence to the principle of consumer sovereignty the discipline to developing economic inforrequires that economic analyses accept existing mation for use in water policy analysis (oads; preference structures rather than entering the Wildavsky, 1979) . If analysis is viewed as a continuous ideological debate over which prefsubstitute for learning by explicit decisionmakerences are appropriate and how particular prefing, the policy economist can offer assistance erences should be advanced by government in the conduct of policy experiments by the action.
application of the tools of a positive economics based upon development of behavioral models Thus, at first it may appear that economists' fafiable hypotheses. Demondisciplinary orientation is ill-suited to the issues tsrations of the empirical relationships amon strations of the empirical relationships among of concern in policy. However, there is an apeconomic variables can offer the client of the proach to policy economics and advising that policy economist insights which only might be can raise the demand for economics research gained by trial and error choicemaking. Likeand advice, and in my judgment, can make a of operations research can be contribution to the operation of the public t o enes aern used to evaluate consequences of alternative choice process. This approach begins by reactions. cognizing the incremental nature of choice in the public sector. Decisionmakers (interest Policy economists can also provide advisory groups and government units) are "probing" support for the participants in the incremental to discover more about the appropriateness of decision process by making the deductive arproblems they might address and possible soguments that can be drawn from three key prinlutions to these problems, where the sets of ciples of economics; opportunity cost, appropriate problems and possible solutions are marginalism, and incentives. However, as will be noted later, these arguments will not be free argument will be illustrated by review of the of ideological overtones. current water policy debate over cost-sharing The principle that any choice will impose an rules for federal water resource development. opportunity cost, as the value of a foregone Traditionally, only a small share of the cost alternative, is often ignored in a political procof federal water projects was borne by project ess where ideological debate is about which beneficiaries. This low cost-share burden, as a values are most appropriate and how these valprogram operating rule, ensured that the ideues can be advanced without regard to foregone ological commitment to water development, opportunities. Therefore, the economist's articulated in the 1930's, would be realized. professional sensitivity to the argument that Thus, full repayment for irrigation water was there is "no free lunch" is a unique contribution continuously modified as an operating rule in in that process. 6 The marginalist perspective of reclamation projects because it conflicted with economics is also a unique perspective in the the ability to develop western agriculture (Burpolicy process. Confusion between marginal and ness, et al.). The Flood Control Acts of the total net gains is frequent in an incremental 1930's and 1940's continuously modified local decision process which looks to the past as a cost-sharing requirements so that construction guide to the future. For example, the past sucof flood control works would not be delayed cess of a program is likely to be cited as jus- (Holmes) . This ideological commitment to detification for its expansion. The policy economist velopment has waned, and the cost sharing issue is inclined to point out that past gains are not has become an especially visible one since the sufficient justification for successive positive inearly 1970s (National Water Commission). crements to a program. Finally, in a real sense, Noting the interest in cost-sharing reform, the the product of the political process is the inwater policy economist might conceptualize stitutions which will direct individuals' behavpolicy research and advice as a marginal cost ior. Behavioral changes can be obtained by pricing problem and prescribe optimal (e.g. appeals to morality, by treats of sanction or by efficient) cost-sharing rules. In fact, in the early incentives (Shultze) . It is the policy economist 1970's a good deal of the research on costwho proposes institutions which rely upon insharing was designed in this manner (Marshall, The subsequent discussion will focus on the studies will be justified. However, it is now art of policy economics which includes two obvious that the debate on cost-sharing continactivities: (i) specifying the aspects of the polues, and t is also clear that these economic icy problem which can be addressed by the studies have had limited influence on that debate. Economists would increase their chances analytic tools of economics and (ii) developing ate conomt would increase their chances a political strategy of policy advising. In both to make a effectie poiey cases, the challenge is to create clients who specified what makes water project cost-sharing cases, the challenge is to create clients who p l will be receptive to economic arguments and a policy problem. analyses. (See Meltsner for an excellent disCost-sharing for water projects is a budget cussion of the relationship of policy analysts to problem and a fairness problem; cost-sharing csinothreainhpopolicy clients.) t levels are a balance of these two concerns. The budget problem is one of distributing limited Specifying the Policy Problem federal financial resources among multiple proSpecifying the Policy Problem grams. As a budget problem, federal cost-shares The existing institutional setting, and the hisare set in relation to the perceived social imtory of an issue as a matter of public concern, portance of expenditures on water development give any policy issue multiple dimensions. Efrelative to competing programs. Thus, the budget fectiveness of the policy economist is enhanced debate over the appropriate level of cost-sharing if these multiple dimensions are clearly underis an ideological debate over the legitimate roles stood so that the conduct of policy research of government in water development. The level and provision of advice address the dimensions of cost-sharing which is "correct" is conditional of the problem relevant to policy debate. This upon resolution of this issue, and not whether water project beneficiaries will pay the marginal
Creating the Policy Problem cost of providing them with a service. Therefore, in the current institutional environment, Policy issues have many dimensions. Howit is certain that the appropriate water project ever, at any time, one particular dimension of cost-share rate will be that rate which discourthe issue dominates how it is defined as a policy ages what is now considered inappropriate fedproblem and dictates the range of acceptable eral expenditures for water project development.
solutions. This dominant dimension of a probThere will not be much economic analyses can lem can be called the "face" of the issue (Alcontribute without entering the public debate lison, p. 168). A second aspect of the art of over the legitimate role of government in this policy economics is ensuring that research and activity.
advice are always addressing the face of each However, existing projects will continue to issue. For the economist, one strategy of policy have operation and maintenance expenses and analysis would be to wait to offer advice until some distribution of this cost burden must be that time when the face of an issue changes "fairly" made. As a fairness problem, water and economic information will be utilized. A project cost-sharing policy has been closely more effective approach is to develop strategies linked to ideas of capacity-to-pay. In the past, of argument to increase receptivity to the availthe commitment to water project development able economic information. Here, the art of would not have been served by asking nonpolicy economics requires active engagement federal interests to pay more than was affordin political debate, seeking to change the face able, because to do so would have been at cross of the issue. purposes with program success. Yet, there has existed a belief that non-federal interests should
The Necessity of Political Economics pay as much as they are "able-to-pay"-an imprecise, but largely agreed to, principle of poEconomists may be reluctant to engage in litical negotiation over cost-sharing policy, ideological political debate. However, the realUnderstanding this fairness dimension of the ity is that the tools of policy economics will policy debate would direct policy economics involve their user in such debate, even if unresearch toward economic impact studies, which willingly. The impossibility of ideologically review the incidence of alternative cost-sharing neutral water policy economics will be illusrules in terms of who would pay, not who trated by a discussion of how two basic argushould pay. Such studies would be well received ments of economics-opportunity cost and the and could direct the political debate toward a desirability of economic incentives-would be consensus on the fairness of a cost-sharing polused and considered in debates over reform of icy. Indeed, as one recent example, economic water pollution law. impact studies isolated the effect on agriculture i
Water pollution law has been under review of full recovery of navigation system operation for the last several years as part of the multiand maintenance costs (Congressional Budget f i o " O Office). These studies demonstrated that the me n of te regulatory reform." One is agricultural sector would have a significant cost c to reiew n e the eisl e co burden shifted to it, and this result was deemed to eie n e t legislative comunfair given the economic difficulties of the mitment to the ideological goals of the 1970's farm sector. These analyses are helping to direct environmental movement. An example of such the search for a consensus on cost share levels a goal the zero discharge goal of the Clean for navigation projects7 Water Act, which is a symbolic statement of a More generally, the models, methods, and commitment to advance water quality improvedata of the policy economist should be directed ment to technically attainable levels, without to address a dimension of a problem which is regard to costs and benefits of doing so. relevant to political debate. The assessment of Economists have become engaged in the rethe policy problem to ensure this result is the view of such environmental goals by their supfirst aspect of "art" of policy economics. If port for more precise application of benefitpolicy economics research proceeds in this cost techniques to environmental regulation, manner, there will be an improvement in the using modern methods of non-market goods productivity of economists, where the product valuation. While many economists express a of their work is facilitating the policy process.
professional scepticism about the validity of Cost-sharing for soil erosion control, which began in the 1930's, illustrates a possible conflict between budget and fairness criteria. Expenditures to assist farmers in soil erosion control have been partially justified by a belief that maintenance of the nation's agricultural land base is a legitimate purpose of government and that soil erosion threatens the productivity of the land base. At the same time, the operating rules for soil erosion control cost-sharing were administered to provide equality of access of funds. However, this fairness standard reduced the effectiveness of erosion control expenditures because funds were not distributed to the most erosion prone soils. As a result, there is now interest in targeting funds to areas and lands with highest erosion rates (Batie) . Thus, economic research on cost-effective targeting approaches is now in demand. these methods and would not support their are said to be "technology based" (Freeman, expanded use, I suspect that most economists 1980) . Reform would permit reallocation of would at least support introducing the principle waste treatment requirements from sources with of opportunity cost into the policy debate, rehigh marginal treatment costs to those with low minding participants that ever higher environmarginal treatment costs providing for reducmental quality comes at a cost; that is, there is tions in aggregate costs with no change in agno "free lunch." gregate waste treatment levels. Typically, the policy economist imagines
To accomplish this reform, economists have himself or herself in the role of objective analyst suggested taxes on waste discharge or pollutionof opportunity costs, helping balance the exrights markets as economic incentive systems cesses of environmental protection against other which would secure any pre-specified level of social priorities. It is useful to hear from the water quality at minimum waste-water treatother side on this point. Leon Billings, who was ment cost. Since 1964, the profession has been in a key policy position (Democratic staff direfining the argument that economic incentive rector of the Senate Environment and Public systems can promote cost-minimizing pollution Works Committee) when the current water polcontrol strategies (Kneese) (Kelman, .
an apparently curious result because the economic incentive schemes would seem to be Economists have too often been surprised by ideologically neutral proposals for institutional being labeled "zealots," because of a failure to change; that is, given a water quality standard, appreciate the nature of public policy. In a the economist can design an institution that political context, the statement of a zero diswill achieve that standard at least cost. charge goal was a reflection of the ability of However, in the context of the emergent idethe environmental movement to impose its ideology of the environmental movement, charge ological stamp upon the policy process and and rights proposals are not perceived as idedirect subsequent incremental pollution conologically neutral. The environmental movetrol decisions. Opportunity cost arguments of ment, and the laws it spawned, attempt to do the policy economist are an attack on that idemore than control pollution. They are part of ological position. The argument is ammunition a larger effort to redefine the values our society for the political battle over values.
holds about its natural environment. The eco-A second dimension of the regulatory reform nomic analyst only cares about how economic issue is the argument that the regulatory stratincentives can influence people to alter polegies of the 1970's environmental legislation luting behavior, without regard to the particular result in attaining environmental improvement values they hold about the importance of enat higher than necessary cost. For example, the vironmental protection. The environmentalist Clean Water Act requires EPA to specify waste challenges and seeks to redirect those values water standards based upon the adoption of through the regulatory structure. Therefore, one uniform waste-treatment technology for classes objection to the use of economic incentives is of industries, without regard to inter-firm difthat they condone polluting behavior by perferences in waste treatment costs and to differmitting pollution if a person is willing to pay ences in the natural assimilative capacity of for the right to pollute. 8 (Kelman, p. 23 purchase the discharge right) or treat their waste. Economists might argue that such flexibility in o ce is that a pitical strategy choice is the key to cost-effectiveness in pelfor policy economics-will vary with the specific choice is the key to cost-effectiveness in polhistorical background and current institutional lution control. However, the memory of how historical background and current institutional lthe unsupervised New Deal agency owas csetting for an issue. However, the general outthe unsupervised New Deal agency was capline of a political strategy for policy economics tured by those it was to regulate must be overo can be illustrated by examples from the issues come before the economic incentive argument can be illustrated by examples from the issues will bef accepted, eooiinetvaruof water quality law reform. 9 First, there must be an acknowledgment of the ideological nature A Political Strategy for Policy of policy economics.' 0 For example, the policy Economics economist often argues that effluent taxes are payments for the right to discharge waste. A For the last decade, water policy has been more effective political argument (e.g. not dominated by the environmental movement's threatening to the environmental ideology) ideology. Operating rules for water quality manwould be that such taxes are penalties for not agement have been designed to promote this stopping pollution. Indeed, our use of the term perspective. At the same time, the tools of water pollution "right" or pollution "permits" is the resources economics have brought economists source of much of the political opposition to into conflict with the new environmental idethe proposals. Words reflect values and a better ology. In short, the face of the water quality term is needed. issue has not been conducive to acceptance of Second, policy economists need to develop water policy economists' arguments.
arguments which change the face of issues so Although there was limited acceptance of ecothey are amenable to economic argument. It is nomics in reform of water quality law, there in this sense that the art of policy economics was a demand for economists by agencies and is "creating" the problem to be solved. For groups who wished to dismantle the traditional example, receptivity to arguments for use of economic incentives in pollution control would CONCLUSION increase, if cost-effectiveness became the domThe issues on the water policy agenda during inant concern in the policy process. Thus, econ-' .
•the next several years are far more numerous omists might effectively lobby environmentalists t n than those discussed in this paper. Examples to adopt this concern for cost-effectiveness by . ., include reforming states' water allocation law, arguing that environmental protection goals will .^ .^~ .^~ uexpanding water quality management programs be weakened in the political process over time e w to control of non-point source pollution, and unless lower cost regulatory structures are put in* pla ce.
• t th* m* tfinancing local government investments in water in place. In this manner, the policy economist in place. In this manner, the policy economist and sewer infrastructure. These issues, and othbecomes the ally of the environmentalist, while ers like them, will be studied by economists, at the same time creating a receptive environbut the usefulness of these studies in the policy ment for the, economic incentive argument. ment fprocess will depend upon economists being As another lobbying approach, the policy more attentive to the "art" of policy analysis. economist might argue that the rigid regulatory
The only natural political constituency for ecostrategy we now have for the highly technical nomic arguments is other economists. With this problem of pollution control, with its intense base of support, we are unlikely to redirect congressional and court review, will overwhelm water resource institutions we must create the the information and oversight capacity of the receptive environment for economic argument. regulatory agency, the Congress and the courts.
However, some economists' comparative adThis will ultimately compromise the goals of vantage, and personal interest, will not lie in clean water by causing lengthy delays in goal problem specification and problem creationattainment. Economists could argue that that ecoe art of policy economics. Many, I suspect nomic incentives based regulatory strategy most economists, will prefer to practice the would expedite the attainment of goals by recraft of policy economics-including develducing the need for detailed review of pollution opment of models and data. At this time, both control technology; that regulators should care graduate training and professional reward sysonly for the goals of clean water and not about tems emphasize the craft aspects of policy ecothe means of pollution control used to attain nomics. More attention to the art of water policy the goals.
economics is needed. While the talented "ecoNote that a political strategy for the policy nomic artists" cannot come from graduate traineconomist (i) requires a precise knowledge of ing alone, broadening the curriculum of students the historical pattern which produced the curto include history, political science, and other rent institutions, and (ii) does not directly stress disciplines will be an indispensable first step the "superiority" of the economists viewpoint, in expanding economists' capacity to improve Also, recognize that the success of the lobbying water policy research, teaching, and'extension. effort is not guaranteed (Crandall) . The key Equally important will be a free flow of econpoint is that failure to redefine issue so that omists between positions in government and receptivity to economic arguments will be inthe universities to permit academic economists creased, inevitably will reduce the effect on to practice policy economics. In the final analypolicy of the most carefully crafted economic sis, the art of policy economics can be learned, analyses.
but it cannot be taught.
